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3. Ehman has no property in Utah, does not maintain
any agents, employees, offices, bank accounts, or physical
facilities in Utah. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16)
4.

Ehman allegedly entered into an oral contract with

Plastic World to have a mold used to manufacture plastic parts
repaired by Plastic World in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R- 2)
5.

Prior to the contract and after the contract was

entered into, Ehman and Plastic World made telephone calls back
and forth. On several occasions the president of Ehman made
trips to Salt Lake City, Utah from Evanston to inspect the
work and to make arrangements for the repairs on the molds which
were shipped from Evanston, Wyoming to Salt Lake City, Utah for
the repairs. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16)
6.

Ehman supplied no services or labor to Plastic

World, all services and labor being

supplied by Plastic

World to Ehman. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16)
7.

A dispute as to the quality of the work on the

molds arose and Plastic World brought this action against
Ehman in Salt Lake County, Utah to collect what it alleged was
due on the oral contract.
8.

Summons and complaint were served in Wyoming upon

9.

The complaint does not contain any allegations

Ehman.

that predicates jurisdiction upon the Utah long-arm statute,
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-22, et.seq., nor does the complaint
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allege that Ehman contracted to deliver goods or services
within the State of Utah or that Ehman is or was doing business
in Utah, or any other allegation to establish jurisdiction. (R- 16)
10.

Ehman filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on jurisdictional grounds, which
motion was denied by the Court. (R- 25)
11.

From this Order denying Ehman's motion to dismiss,

Ehman filed a motion with the Utah Court of Appeals to allow it
to file an interlocutory appeal in this matter, which motion was
granted by the Court. (R-40)
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES
THAT A DEFENDANT BE SUED IN
HIS HOME STATE UNLESS HE HAS
ENGAGED IN BUSINESS OR OTHER
ACTIVITY IN A SISTER STATE WHICH
WOULD INVOKE JURISDICTION OVER
HIM
The question of jurisdiction over non-residents
has provided a great amount of appellate time and effort
over the years and the guidelines of when will jurisdiction
vest have now been quite clearly drawn.
The several states of the union have invoked what
are commonly called long-arm statutes as a means of granting
to their respective courts jurisdiction over persons from
sister states who are carrying on business within that state
or whose contacts or activities are such that jurisiction of
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that state will attach under the long-arm statutes.
The hallmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Brown
(1945) 326 US 310, 90 L. Ed 95, 66 S Ct 154 established certain
guidelines for claiming jurisdiction over a non resident.
Early on the courts focused upon the standard
of "doing business" within the state as a means of attaching
jurisdiction, but as time progressed a new standard of "minimal
contacts" arose. Hanson v. Denckla, (1953) 375 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d
1283,78 S Ct 1228.

Utah adheres to the "significant minimal

contacts" rule. Kocha v. Gibson Products Co., 535 P. 2d 680
(Utah 1975)
The Utah Court recognized that there is a
distinction between "doing business" and "minimal contacts" and
in the case of Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & Associates,
618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980) pointed out that there is a
significant difference between the two concepts. The difference
is that "doing business" covers a general type of jurisdiction
while "minimal contacts" bestows a special jurisdiction which
must hinge on the long arm statutes requirements.

The Court at

footnote 4 observed:
"Conversely, if the activities of the
defendant are limited in nature or
transitory in duration, the courts may
assume jurisdiction over that person
only in relation to causes of action
related to the activity of the
defendant in the state. To assume this
"special" jurisdiction, the courts must
employ the Long Arm Statute." (Citing
authority)
(Emphasis mine)
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Reference must be made to the long-arm statute to
ascertain what is general and what is special.
Utah Code Ann 78-27-24 sets out seven (7) criteria,
however in Mallory Engineering, the Court deemed the first
criteria (doing business within the state) as being in the
general category.
Under the facts of this case now before the Court
of Appeals the only relevant criteria is number two (2)
which reads:
" (2) contracting to supply services or
goods in this state.11
Actually under the facts of this case this criteria is not
applicable, but it is the only one that the Trial Court could
possibly, under the facts, attempt to find jurisdiction.
Why this is not applicable is that the defendant did
not contract to supply service or goods in this state.

It

allegedly contracted for services or goods in this state.
Plaintiff's complaint is silent as to just what
it is predicating its theory of jurisdiction on, which is its
burden to affirmatively show. Union Ski Company v. Union
Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976). This brief, of
necessity, must attempt to ferret out any theory upon which
jurisdiction would lie based upon the case law and statutory
provisions of Utah law.
No allegation is made in the complaint that the
transaction between plaintiff and defendant was more than
a one time matter. Assuming that it was a one time
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transaction, then the case of Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580
P. 2d 596 (Utah 1978) would seem to be applicable, wherein
it was held that the District Court had no jurisdiction over
a Wyoming resident for a single transaction of buying a
ring in Utah in an action brought by the store to set aside
the transaction on the grounds of mistake.
Even assuming a series of phone calls and visits to
Utah, and even the shipment of goods out of Utah, this is not
sufficient to establish a presence in Utah to envoke
jurisdiction.

For cases, factually, pointing this out, See:

Cate Rental Company, Inc. v. Whalen & Company, 549 P.2d 707
(Utah 1976); Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Company, 548 P.2d
1257 (Utah 1976) . See also:

White v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,

549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) and cases cited at footnote 1
thereof.
It is submitted that the Court can only look to the
allegations of the complaint or any affidavits filed to
determine if jurisdiction will lie.

Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco,

Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980).
The affidavit of the defendant's president, which was
unchallenged by the plaintiff, Kocha, (supra) clearly showed
that defendant was not doing business in Utah and that this
was a one time transaction.

Had the complaint alleged factual

jurisdictional matters the Trial Court could have followed
Roskelley with respect to affidavits or examined into the
facts as in Mallory Engineering.
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In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd.,
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court pointed out
that due process requires that "before a court can exercise
specific personal jurisdiction" over a resident of another
state there must be minimal contacts of such a magnitude that
the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
are observed and that the defendant's contacts are such that
he could reasonably anticipate being "haled into Court" in
Utah.

In Mallory, the court used the word "special"

jurisdiction while in Synergetics the court used the word
"specific", but it is submitted that there is little or no
practical difference.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S CONTACTS IN UTAH
DID NOT REACH THE LEVEL OF A
MINIMAL CONTACT UNDER THE
LONG-ARM STATUTE
The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down
guidelines on the question of minimal contacts.

In the case

of Helicopteros Nactionales de Columbia v. Hall, (1984) 466 US
408, 80 L. Ed 2d 404, 104 S. Ct 1868, the Court reaffirmed
several earlier cases which predated the International Shoe
case, but which the Supreme Court said were still applicable
in determining due process and jurisdiction over non
residents.

The facts of Helicopteros, were that a foreign
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corporation negotiated through its president for the purchase
of helicopters from Bell Helicopter Corporation, the
negotiations having taken place in Texas. After the purchase
contract was entered into, in Texas, personnel from the
purchaser traveled to Texas for instruction on the maintenance
of the helicopters, payments were made in Texas on the
aircraft but drawn on foreign banks. A suit was brought in
Texas against Helicopteros and upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States the court ruled that there were
insufficient contacts to establish the requirements of due
process under the 14th Amendment.
The Supreme Court cited the case of Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Curtis Brown, (1923) 260 US 516, 67 L. Ed 372, 43 S
Ct

170, and reaffirmed its holdings.

In this case, a man

operating a clothing store in Oklahoma would journey to New
York annually to purchase clothing for the next year's
business, would have the clothing shipped to him in Oklahoma
and would send the necessary purchase monies to New York.
The Court in this case established

that there must be

"continuous and systematic" contacts, but that purchases
and frequent trips to accomplish the purchases, standing alone
were insufficient for a state to assert its jurisdiction over
the individual.

See Also: Kulko v. California Superior

Court, (1978) 436 US 93, 56 L Ed 2d 132, 98 S Ct 1690.
The affidavit of the defendant's president refutes
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any allegation of doing business, although not plead, and
also refutes any minimal contacts necessary to impute
jurisdiction.
Utah has never answered the question of ordering and
purchasing supplies or work to be performed for someone
outside of the state, although the Statute and cases decided
under the statute clearly show that if one contracts to
deliver work or services in the state, jurisdiction will
attach. Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., (supra); Mallory
Engineering Co v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, (supra).
As this statute states what it does and as this
statute has been on the books of the laws of Utah since
1969 (L. 1969, Ch 246, § 3) and was amended in 1983 (1983,
Ch 160, § 1) and again in 1987 (1987, Ch. 35, § 1)

it

hardly can be said that the legislature has not had an
opportunity to amend the statute had it seen fit to do
so.

It is a rule of Utah that where the legislature has

amended a portion of a statute but left the rest in tact,
absent substantial

evidence to the contrary, the legislature

is presumed to be satisfied with the unaltered portions of
the statute and the court decisions based thereon.
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).
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POINT THREE
THE FILING OF A MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER RULE 12 (b)
IS NOT A GENERAL APPEARANCE
Ehmanfs motion to dismiss was framed under Rule
12(b), Utah Rules of Civl Procedure based upon the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Such a motion is not a general appearance. Ted R.
Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp. 547 P.2d 206
(Utah 1976) ; Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown and
Associates, (supra.).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred in not granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
Substantial minimal contacts were neither plead nor
shown by affidavit.
Doing business in Utah was not plead nor shown by
affidavit.
Conversely, the affidavit of Ehman's president,
affirmatively showed that the contacts with Utah were not
substantial or systamatic and that Ehman did not do business
within the State of Utah under the guidelines of the cases
heretofore decided on the subject.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of
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Appeals should reverse the order of Judge Hutchings, remand
the matter back with instructions to enter an order dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and awarding Ehman its costs.
ULLY SUBMITTED,

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Appellant
Suite 280, 311 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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This is to certify that on the &i6~* day of
October,

1988, the undersigned caused three copies of the

foregoing Brief to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing
the same into the United States Mails, postage prepaid and
addressed to:
Les F. England, Esq.
Attorney at Law
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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ADDENDA

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-22
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-24
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LES F. ENGLAND (#3646)
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 278-7755
Attorney for Plaintiff
—ooOoo—
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
PLASTIC WORLD, INC.

*
*

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.

*

EHMAN ENGINEERING, INC.,

*

Defendants.

*

Case No. 883 2558 CV
Judge Hutchings

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
Honorable Judge McCleave on April 13, 1988 at the hour of 1:30
p.m.

Judge McCleave ordered that the matter be transferred to

Judge Hutchings.

Upon stipulation and consent of counsel for

both parties the matter was submitted to Judge Hutchings on
pleadings and memorandum with a waiver of oral argument.
Based upon the pleadings, memorandum and affidavits in the
file, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is denied, and defendant shall have 10 days from the date
hereof to file an appropriate answer to plaintiff's complaint.
DATED this 3_2

da

Y

of

Ap»*l, 1988.

-A£

Judge Michael Hutchings
lefe M
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on the /7

day of April, 1988, I

caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
postage prepaid to the following:
Mr. Paul Cotro-Manes
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Please take notice that this service is made pursuant to
Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in Circuit Courts, State of Utah and
that if there are any objections to said order the same must be
filed five days after service.

The Order shall be submitted to

the Court for signature and entry after said period of time
without further notice.
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78-27-22, Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Purpose of
provision.
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this
state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding § 16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendent had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
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